Life in India · Long View 4: Business groups

Other People’s Money and How the Bankers Use It

Wed, 30 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT

A book by the lawyer Louis D. Brandeis, gathered from his articles in Harper’s Weekly, which ran from August 1913 to December 1914, on how a few investment bankers came to run American business. Brandeis argues that four separate trades ended up in the same few hands: selling securities, directing railroads and factories, running life insurance companies, and holding bank deposits. The most potent instrument of that power, he writes, was the interlocking directorate: boards shared between firms that competed or did business with each other. J. P. Morgan & Co. held deposits of $162,491,819.65 on November 1, 1912, he writes, and the $22,000,000,000 credited to the inner group by the Pujo Committee understates what it controls.

Book · added 30.09.2026

By Louis D. Brandeis.

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Transfer of Zaibatsu Family Properties to Holding Company Liquidation Commission

Wed, 30 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT

The Allied occupation’s order directing the Imperial Japanese Government to hand the property of Japan’s designated families and family members to the Holding Company Liquidation Commission, which was to receive, hold, manage and eventually liquidate it and compensate them. It gave the government five days to widen the commission’s jurisdiction, and moved to the commission the work the Ministry of Finance had been doing in supervising those families, along with its files and records. A memo for record in the same file says it was proposed to liquidate their wealth by converting their assets into non-negotiable government bonds.

Directive · added 30.09.2026

By John B. Cooley.

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The Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State

Wed, 30 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT

A communication from the United States Political Adviser in Japan to the Secretary of State, enclosing a memorandum to the Japanese Government, Scapin 1741, on the dissolution of trading companies, issued by his headquarters on 3 July 1947. The directive gave specific instructions for dissolving the Mitsubishi and Mitsui Trading Companies through the Japanese Holding Company Liquidation Commission. The chief of the headquarters’ Anti-trust and Cartels Division told an officer of the mission what was intended for the restricted companies, the so-called Zaibatsu. Their individual components would be reorganised rather than dissolved. The exceptions were the two large trading companies and a very few others, which he said were not essential to the Japanese economy and produced no goods. He felt that letting firms such as Mitsubishi and Mitsui enter foreign trade, with their foreign contacts and previous informal cartels, might direct that trade to former subsidiary companies in Japan. That would leave new businesses and small manufacturers at a disadvantage.

Report · added 30.09.2026

By Atcheson.

Excerpt quoted for review under section 52 of the Copyright Act, 1957. The report belongs to Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Far East, Volume VI.

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Report of the Monopolies Inquiry Commission 1965: Volumes I and II

Wed, 30 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT

The Monopolies Inquiry Commission sat in Delhi throughout its sittings and undertook no tours, and its 1965 report counted who held the market in one product after another, then added up the holdings of whole business groups. It found a single firm or a small handful dominant in many goods. The majority concluded that business groups spreading into new industries, and the country-wise concentration that comes with it, was a necessary evil for the country’s industrial development. It still had to be watched for monopolistic and restrictive practices. R. C. Dutt recorded a note of dissent, listed in the report’s contents as the Note of Dissent by Shri R. C. Dutt.

Reporting · added 30.09.2026

By Monopolies Inquiry Commission.

Excerpt quoted for review under section 52 of the Copyright Act, 1957. The report belongs to Report of the Monopolies Inquiry Commission, 1965, Volumes I and II.

Industrial Planning and Licensing Policy: Final Report

Wed, 30 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT

R. K. Hazari, appointed an honorary consultant to the Planning Commission in July 1966 to study licensing under the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, submitted this final report on 14 September 1967. From the files of the Licensing Committee he picked out 28 houses, each of which applied for licences involving investment above ₹10 crore. Between 1959 and June 1966 they filed 1,961 applications, 21 per cent of all applications net of those deferred. The Birla group applied for such a wide range of products that, he wrote, it was to some extent legitimate to infer that it tended to pre-empt licensable capacity in many industries. Whether that kept other firms out was an open question.

Reporting · added 30.09.2026

By R. K. Hazari.

Excerpt quoted for review under section 52 of the Copyright Act, 1957. The report belongs to Volume I: Text.

Report of the Industrial Licensing Policy Enquiry Committee (Main Report)

Wed, 30 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT

The Industrial Licensing Policy Inquiry Committee examined how India’s industrial licensing system had worked over the decade to 1966, and whether the larger industrial houses had secured an undue advantage over other applicants in the issue of licences. Its answer was that the disproportion was real but concentrated in a few houses, not spread evenly across the group. It counted the 20 Larger Industrial Houses together with their second-tier concerns, firms it treated as tied to a house though outside its core. Together they held about 31 per cent of the private corporate sector’s paid-up capital in 1958–59. They took 41 per cent of the investment proposed in approved licence applications, and 40 per cent of the capital goods approvals given at first consideration. In one product it studied, rayon grade pulp, large houses held about 84 per cent of the licensed capacity.

Reporting · added 30.09.2026

By Subimal Dutt and H. K. Paranjape and S. Mohan Kumaramangalam.

Excerpt quoted for review under section 52 of the Copyright Act, 1957. The report belongs to Main Report.

United States of America v. Western Electric Company, Incorporated, and American Telephone and Telegraph Company

Wed, 30 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT

The 1982 decree in the United States government’s case against AT&T and Western Electric, which ordered AT&T to transfer its local Bell operating companies out of its ownership. AT&T had to submit a plan of reorganization to the Department of Justice for its approval and then carry it out, completing the separation within 18 months after the decree took effect. On a phased schedule, the local companies then had to give every long-distance carrier and information service provider access to their networks equal in type, quality and price to what AT&T got.

Judgment · added 30.09.2026

Corporate Restructuring : Performance and Future Plan

Wed, 30 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT

Korea’s Financial Services Commission set out in December 1998 how the country’s chaebol were to be restructured. Major creditor financial institutions would take the leading role, signing capital structure improvement plans with the largest sixty-four chaebol. The biggest five, Hyundai, Samsung, Daewoo, LG and SK, were expected to bear the costs their own reorganisation brought, while nonviable firms would be forced to exit promptly and viable ones supported through workout programmes.

Press release · added 30.09.2026

By Financial Services Commission.

Excerpt quoted for review under section 52 of the Copyright Act, 1957. The report belongs to Financial Services Commission.

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Report of the High Level Committee on Competition Policy and Law

Wed, 30 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT

In October 1999 the Department of Company Affairs set up a committee under S.V.S. Raghavan to examine the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969 and say whether it should be amended or replaced. This is its report. The committee found that the 1969 Act never even named the practices it was meant to catch, from abuse of dominance to cartels and predatory pricing. It asked for the Act to be repealed, the MRTP Commission wound up, and a Competition Commission of India set up in its place.

Report · added 30.09.2026

By S.V.S. Raghavan and Mala Banerjee and S. Chakravarthy and K.B. Dadiseth and Rakesh Mohan and Sudhir Mulji and P.M. Narielvala and Pallavi Shroff and G.P. Prabhu.

Excerpt quoted for review under section 52 of the Copyright Act, 1957. The report belongs to Department of Company Affairs, Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs, Government of India.

United States of America v. Microsoft Corporation

Wed, 30 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT

The US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed in part and reversed in part the ruling that Microsoft broke section 2 of the Sherman Act by holding on to its operating system monopoly. Windows ran on more than 95% of Intel-compatible personal computers. The court found that share protected by an applications barrier to entry: most buyers want the system with the most software, and most developers write for the system with the most users. The judges agreed that Microsoft used its Windows licences to stop computer makers promoting rival browsers. That cut those browsers’ share of users and kept developers focused on Windows. They upheld one such restriction: the ban on a maker replacing the Windows desktop automatically at start-up. They reversed the finding that Microsoft tried to monopolize the browser market, and sent the tying claim back for a fresh look. They also set aside the order to split the company, after finding that the trial judge held secret interviews with reporters and made offensive comments about Microsoft officials in public.

Judgment · added 30.09.2026

By Edwards, Chief Judge and Williams, Circuit Judge and Ginsburg, Circuit Judge and Sentelle, Circuit Judge and Randolph, Circuit Judge and Rogers, Circuit Judge and Tatel, Circuit Judge.

The Competition Act, 2002

Wed, 30 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT

The law that repealed the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act of 1969 and set up the Competition Commission of India. It prohibits agreements between firms that harm competition. It prohibits an enterprise or group from abusing its dominant position, for instance by imposing unfair or discriminatory prices or conditions. And it lets the Commission regulate large mergers and acquisitions, which the Act calls combinations.

Act · added 30.09.2026

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Business Groups in Emerging Markets: Paragons or Parasites?

Wed, 30 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT

Tarun Khanna of Harvard Business School and Yishay Yafeh of Hebrew University survey the research on the family-run, multi-industry groups that dominate most emerging markets. They ask whether the groups are ‘paragons’ or ‘parasites.’ Their conclusion is that no verdict is possible yet: the studies used to condemn groups, on tunneling and rent-seeking, are less conclusive than they are usually read to be. On whether groups hold market power, they can offer only a conjecture.

Working paper · added 30.09.2026

By Tarun Khanna and Yishay P. Yafeh.

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Director General (Investigation and Registration) v. Cement Manufacturers' Association

Wed, 30 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT

In 1990 the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission issued a notice of enquiry against the Cement Manufacturers’ Association and 44 cement producers. The complaint was that they fixed the price of cement in an arbitrary and unjustified manner. Prices of several manufacturers in the same region were uniform, though the cost of production of different units differed. The bench did not decide the case until December 2007, when it held that the association had been the common platform through which the firms moved prices together, and ordered them to stop. It said the guilt would pass to successor companies if there was a change in management since the start of the enquiry.

Monopolies & Restrictive Trade Practices Commission, New Delhi judgment · added 30.09.2026

By M.M.K. Sardana.

Prices, Markups and Trade Reform

Wed, 30 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT

The paper behind this column looked at how the prices and markups of Indian firms moved after the tariff cuts India made in the early 1990s. When firms can charge above their costs, the pro-competitive channel says cheaper imports should force markups down and prices closer to costs. The source notes that this channel is absent from traditional trade models, which assume either perfect competition or markups that do not respond to policy. Here competition did push markups down on its own, but the tariff cuts also made imported inputs cheaper, and that effect lifted markups by more. On net markups rose, and prices fell by much less than costs.

Research paper · added 30.09.2026

By Jan De Loecker and Penny Goldberg and Amit Khandelwal and Nina Pavcnik.

Read the study

Prices, Markups, and Trade Reform

Wed, 30 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT

An Econometrica paper that measures what India’s tariff cuts did to factory-gate prices, marginal costs and markups, using product-level price and quantity data from Prowess, the CMIE’s firm database. Prices fell 18.1 percent and marginal costs 30.7 percent over 1989 to 1997, while markups rose 12.6 percent: firms kept much of the saving from cheaper imported inputs instead of passing it to buyers. It matters to this Long View because the markups it estimates vary widely across firms and products, and because it tests, and finds nothing distinctive about, firms that belong to Indian business groups.

Research paper · added 30.09.2026

By Jan De Loecker and Pinelopi K. Goldberg and Amit K. Khandelwal and Nina Pavcnik.

In Re: Builders Association of India

Wed, 30 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT

The Commission decided this case twice. It found the cement makers in contravention in June 2012, and the appellate tribunal set that order aside in December 2015. This fresh order followed hearings in January 2016. It found no abuse of dominance, since no single firm or group was in a position to operate independent of competitive forces. But at paragraph 286 it held that the cement companies had used the Cement Manufacturers’ Association as a platform to share details of prices, capacity utilisation, production and dispatch. That, it held, restricted production and supply, and the companies had acted in concert to fix prices. The DG’s investigation report described the cement industry as oligopolistic, with the Holcim group controlling ACC and Ambuja and the Birla group controlling UltraTech. The top three companies held about 40% of the total market share.

Judgment · added 30.09.2026

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In Re: Bharti Airtel Limited

Wed, 30 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT

On 9 June 2017 the Competition Commission of India closed Bharti Airtel’s complaint against Reliance Jio Infocomm and its parent, Reliance Industries, without ordering an investigation. Airtel called Jio’s free voice and data offers, running since September 2016, predatory pricing, and said Reliance’s money was paying for it. The Commission found Jio was not dominant: it held 6.4 per cent of wireless subscribers, and never more than 7 per cent in any circle. It held that an entrant’s short-term strategy of attractive offers to penetrate the market cannot be considered anti-competitive in nature. Without dominance, it noted, the question of examining the alleged abuse did not arise.

Judgment · added 30.09.2026

By Devender Kumar Sikri and S. L. Bunker and Sudhir Mital and Augustine Peter and U. C. Nahta and Justice G. P. Mittal.

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Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox

Wed, 30 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT

Lina M. Khan’s note in the Yale Law Journal argues that American antitrust lost the means to see a firm like Amazon once it took up the Chicago school’s test. That test measures competition by short-run prices and treats market power as harmless until prices rise. She follows that test through the law on predatory pricing and vertical integration, and sets out Amazon’s strategy of sustained losses and expansion across many lines of business. She offers two answers: restore a test built on competitive process and market structure, or regulate dominant platforms as common carriers. It is the American strand of the argument over concentrated business power that this Long View follows.

Research paper · added 30.09.2026

By Lina M. Khan.

Ambuja Cements Limited v. Competition Commission of India & Ors.

Wed, 30 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT

India’s competition tribunal upheld the finding that 11 cement companies and their association ran a cartel, and dismissed their appeals. The companies argued that parallel prices were ordinary in a commodity where everyone can see everyone’s prices, and that no agreement had been shown. The Tribunal answered that the association’s own minutes, and its collection and circulation of each member’s prices, production and dispatches, proved a meeting of minds. It added that the market had been looked at state by state and region by region. A cartel, it held, need be proved only on a balance of probabilities, and the minimum penalty stood.

Judgment · added 30.09.2026

By Sudhansu Jyoti Mukhopadhaya and Balvinder Singh.

Finance Ministry, NITI Aayog guidelines ignored in airport privatisation

Wed, 30 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT

The Hindu’s account, built on the record of the 85th PPP Appraisal Committee, of how the Centre cleared the leasing of airports owned by the Airports Authority of India. The Finance Ministry’s Department of Economic Affairs asked for a cap on the number of airports a single bidder could take, and NITI Aayog wanted prior operation and management experience. The committee cited an Empowered Group of Secretaries decision and set both aside. Three days after that meeting the Airports Authority of India floated its tender, and Adani Enterprises Limited was declared the highest bidder for all six airports, with the suggestions of the government’s own advisers on the file.

Report · added 30.09.2026

By Jagriti Chandra.

Excerpt quoted for review under section 52 of the Copyright Act, 1957. The report belongs to The Hindu.

Understanding India’s Economic Slowdown

Wed, 30 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT

R Nagaraj’s I G Patel Memorial Lecture, published in The India Forum, traces where the credit of the 2000s boom went. Bank credit to the private corporate sector grew at an unprecedented pace and a large share reached big business and politically connected firms; when the boom broke, their unpaid loans became the banks’ bad debts. Nagaraj argues the decade of distress that followed was made at home by policy, and that a government which saw crony capitalism and weak bank screening missed a collapse in demand that public investment could have answered.

Reporting · added 30.09.2026

By R Nagaraj.

Excerpt quoted for review under section 52 of the Copyright Act, 1957. The report belongs to The India Forum.

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Regulatory Measures to Dismantle Pyramidal Business Groups: Evidence from the United States, Japan, Korea and Israel

Wed, 30 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT

Assaf Hamdani, Konstantin Kosenko and Yishay Yafeh compare how the United States, Japan, Korea and Israel each went after the large corporate entities they call pyramidal business groups, Korea’s chaebol among them. Korea tried several kinds of rules, then settled on corporate governance reform, and its groups still dominate the economy. Where governments wrote rules aimed at the pyramids and applied them consistently over years, with politics on their side, the groups went.

Research paper · added 30.09.2026

By Assaf Hamdani and Konstantin Kosenko and Yishay Yafeh.

Pro-Business versus Pro-Crony

Wed, 30 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT

The Economic Survey for 2019–20 gave a chapter to the difference between policy that makes firms compete and policy that favours the well connected, and used the Sensex as its measure of churn. A firm entering the index in 1986 could have expected sixty years on it; the survey puts the expected stay now at twelve. It reports that an index of firms with political connections beat the market by 7 per cent a year from 2007 to 2010, then underperformed by 7.5 per cent from 2011.

Chapter of the Economic Survey · added 30.09.2026

By Government of India.

Excerpt quoted for review under section 52 of the Copyright Act, 1957. The report belongs to Economic Survey 2019-20, Volume 1.

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Market Study on the Telecom Sector in India: Key Findings and Observations

Wed, 30 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT

The Competition Commission of India began this study of the telecom market in January 2020 and published its key findings in January 2021, with the Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations (ICRIER) as implementation partner. It describes a market that consolidated until Jio, Airtel and Vodafone-Idea owned almost 88.4 per cent of it, and where average industry revenue fell in every year from 2016–17 to 2018–19. When the incumbents asked the regulator to fix a floor price, the Commission advised it to keep tariff forbearance.

Reporting · added 30.09.2026

By Competition Commission of India.

Excerpt quoted for review under section 52 of the Copyright Act, 1957. The report belongs to Competition Commission of India.

Mr. Umar Javeed, Ms. Sukarma Thapar and Mr. Aaqib Javeed v. Google LLC and Google India Private Limited

Wed, 30 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT

The Competition Commission’s order on a complaint by three consumers of Android phones against Google. The Commission found that a phone maker wanting to preload even Google’s Play Store had to sign agreements committing it to preinstall Google’s full suite of apps. Through this tying, it found, Google used Android to cement the dominance of its search engine. The Commission’s own chart put Android at 98.50% of smartphone and tablet shipments in India at the end of 2018.

Order · added 30.09.2026

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India at 75: Replete with Contradictions, Brimming with Opportunities, Saddled with Challenges

Wed, 30 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT

Viral Acharya wrote this paper for the Spring 2023 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity conference, and the part that belongs in this Long View is his count of how concentrated Indian industry has become. With Rahul Singh Chauhan, working from CMIE’s Prowess Dx database, he finds the largest non-financial groups losing ground after the 1991 reforms and then gaining from 2015. By 2021 the Big-5 of Reliance, Tata, Aditya Birla, Adani and Bharti Telecom held nearly 18% of non-financial sector assets, while the next five groups fell under 9%. He links that market power to markups back at their 1990s level and to higher wholesale price inflation, and proposes dismantling the largest conglomerates.

Research · added 30.09.2026

By Viral V Acharya.

The Competition (Amendment) Act, 2023

Wed, 30 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT

Parliament passed this Act to amend the Competition Act, 2002, and it reaches combination thresholds, cartel penalties and investigation powers, and adds settlement and commitment provisions. Once it is brought into force, a new test applies to deals for control, shares, voting rights or assets of an enterprise, and to mergers. Such a deal will count as a combination if it is worth more than rupees two thousand crore and the target has substantial business operations in India. For the purposes of section 5, a group means two or more enterprises where one can exercise twenty-six per cent of the voting rights in the other, appoint more than half its board, or control its management or affairs. Failing to notify a deal can cost up to one per cent of the total turnover or assets or the deal value, whichever is higher. Each member of a cartel faces up to three times its profit or ten per cent of its turnover or income for each year the agreement ran, whichever is higher. A firm under inquiry over a vertical agreement, one between firms at different stages of a supply chain, or over abuse of dominance, may apply to settle on payment of an amount or offer commitments, which the Commission may accept. No appeal lies against either order.

Act · added 30.09.2026

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Ecowrap: Factually Incorrect to Conjecture That Industrial Concentration Power Dictates Pricing Capacity of Firms in India: Corporate Ecosystem in India Thrives on Coexistence of Large & Small Players

Wed, 30 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT

SBI Research tested the claim that the pricing power of a few big firms keeps India’s core inflation high, and rejected it. An index that reweights the consumer price index by how concentrated each sector is stayed below core CPI from January 2015, rising above it from January to November 2020 and also further during the pandemic, as supply disruptions weighed heavily. The bank’s model traced general inflation to food: a 1% increase in food CPI raised general CPI by 0.6% between April 2014 and February 2023. Its economists also found Indian companies outlast those elsewhere, with nearly 45% trading for more than 20 years.

Research · added 30.09.2026

By Soumya Kanti Ghosh.

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2023 Merger Guidelines

Wed, 30 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT

The US Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission issued these guidelines in December 2023 to set out how they choose which mergers to challenge under the Sherman, Clayton and FTC Acts. They are the American half of the question this Long View follows: how concentrated a market may get before the law steps in. They answer it with a hard threshold. A deal that leaves a market above 1,800 on the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, and lifts it by more than 100 points, is presumed unlawful unless the parties rebut it. The same document lets the agencies weigh a firm’s whole run of takeovers as one strategy, and says the economies a merger promises cannot excuse it.

Report · added 30.09.2026

By U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission.

Excerpt quoted for review under section 52 of the Copyright Act, 1957. The report belongs to U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission.

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Parliamentary panel suggests route-specific capping of airfares

Wed, 30 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT

A standing committee of Parliament has told the government that airlines cannot be left to police their own ticket prices, and it wants a route-by-route ceiling on fares plus a separate body with quasi-judicial powers to control what carriers charge. The report says fares are set by revenue management and the drive to maximise shareholder value, and that self regulation by the airlines has not worked. It belongs here as a working example of how the argument over market power plays out in one industry.

Reporting · added 30.09.2026

By PTI.

Excerpt quoted for review under section 52 of the Copyright Act, 1957. The report belongs to The Indian Express.

Why tariff hikes by Airtel, Jio,Vi were inevitable

Wed, 30 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT

This Indian Express report records Reliance Jio, Bharti Airtel and Vodafone Idea announcing tariff rises within hours of each other in June 2024. It also gives the industry’s own case for them: that what a subscriber pays each month is too low for the business to stay healthy. Jio, which a JP Morgan note calls the sector’s price setter, led the round this time, and the bank reads that as a statement of intent that its focus has shifted from share gains to monetisation.

Reporting · added 30.09.2026

By Soumyarendra Barik.

Excerpt quoted for review under section 52 of the Copyright Act, 1957. The report belongs to The Indian Express.

Tariff hike by telecom companies complies with the prescribed regulatory framework: DoT

Wed, 30 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT

The Congress attacked last week’s mobile tariff hikes as an extra burden on customers, and the Ministry of Communication answered the next day. In a press statement, the Department of Telecommunications said the increases were made under the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Act, 1997, which gives TRAI the power to set telecom rates. For the past two decades TRAI has determined mobile rates under forbearance. The government also said that with three private players and one public sector player, the mobile services market operates under the forces of demand and supply, and pointed to heavy 5G spending by some of the service providers.

News report · added 30.09.2026

By Rakesh Kumar.

Excerpt quoted for review under section 52 of the Copyright Act, 1957. The report belongs to The New Indian Express.

Anti-big, Anti-global? India's Competition Law and Policy for Dominant Enterprises

Wed, 30 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT

A Mercatus research paper on India’s competition law, arguing that the Competition Act, 2002 and the Competition Commission of India carry an anti-big bias inherited from the MRTP Act, 1969, and often equate size with wrongdoing. It records that the five largest conglomerates (Reliance, Tata, Aditya Birla, Adani and Bharti Telecom) raised their share of assets in more than 40 major nonfinancial sectors from 10 percent in 1991 to 18 percent in 2021. Over the same years the next five biggest groups fell from 18 percent in 1992 to less than 9 percent in 2021. It asks that Section 4 be amended so harm to competition and consumers must be shown, and that Section 28, which lets the CCI break up firms, be dropped.

Research paper · added 30.09.2026

By Shreyas Narla.

Passengers Satisfaction at Adani-operated Airport

Wed, 30 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT

Seven airports of the Airports Authority of India (Mumbai, Lucknow, Ahmedabad, Mangaluru, Jaipur, Guwahati and Thiruvananthapuram) are now operated and managed by subsidiaries of Adani Airports Holdings, the government told the Rajya Sabha on 4 August 2025. Private airports averaged 4.96 out of five in the 2024 Airport Service Quality survey run by Airport Council International; AAI’s own airports averaged 4.81. The user development fee is typically higher at leased and PPP airports, the reply says, because the capital spending on infrastructure there is far larger than at AAI’s airports.

Parliamentary answer · added 30.09.2026

By Murlidhar Mohol.

Read the reply

IndiGo and Air India Hold 91% of Domestic Aviation Market, Govt Tells Parliament

Wed, 30 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT

The civil aviation ministry’s written reply to a Rajya Sabha question, reported here, sets out the government’s own count of how few airlines sell most domestic seats. It lists the market share held by each major and regional carrier, the flights IndiGo cancelled during its December 2025 meltdown, the passengers affected and the compensation the minister says it has paid. The crisis followed new duty-time rules that IndiGo was accused of failing to plan for adequately. For the December 3 to 5 cancellations the airline cited crew shortages, though for the month’s disruptions it said it could not pinpoint the exact cause.

Report · added 30.09.2026

By The Wire Staff.

Excerpt quoted for review under section 52 of the Copyright Act, 1957. The report belongs to The Wire.

Results presentation – Q4 & FY26

Wed, 30 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT

The results deck Adani Ports and Special Economic Zone Limited took to investors for the quarter and year ended March 2026. It maps the reach of the company’s ports business: 653 million tonnes of port capacity, 136 marine vessels, 12 multi-modal logistics parks and 3.1 million sq ft of warehouses. It gives the company’s own figures for its market share: 27.1% of all cargo handled in India and 45.5% of its container traffic.

Earnings presentation · added 30.09.2026

By Adani Ports and Special Economic Zone Limited.

Excerpt quoted for review under section 52 of the Copyright Act, 1957. The report belongs to Earnings presentation.

The results deck

In 2020, India's Big Five Family Businesses Held Over 60% of Top 25 FBGs' Revenues Combined: Study

Wed, 30 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT

The Wire reports on a study in the World Bank Economic Review, ‘Business Groups, Concentration and Market Power in India’, on how far India’s biggest family business groups dominate corporate income. The study found that market concentration fell after liberalisation as the public sector shrank, yet the large groups kept their hold and spread into new sectors, and their mark-ups rose sharply after slipping a little between 2000 and 2013.

Reporting · added 30.09.2026

By The Wire Staff.

Excerpt quoted for review under section 52 of the Copyright Act, 1957. The report belongs to The Wire.

Business Groups, Concentration and Market Power in India

Wed, 30 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT

The top 25 family business groups ended two decades of liberalisation with a larger share of India’s economy than they began it: their revenues rose from 11 to 15 percent of GDP between 2001 and 2020. Working from CMIE Prowess records on nearly 500,000 observations, Simon Commander, Saul Estrin, Naveen Joseph Thomas and Varun Lingineni measure concentration industry by industry. They find that the fall in concentration across India came mainly from the shrinking state sector, while a block of industries stayed highly concentrated. For the largest groups, the ratio of sales to variable costs turned up after 2013, a rise of 16 percent by 2020.

Research · added 30.09.2026

By Simon Commander and Saul Estrin and Naveen Joseph Thomas and Varun Lingineni.